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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ON THE ROAD TO LIQUID WARFARE?\ MAX M. MUTSCHLER
This Working Paper examines military interventions by precision strikes from 
a distance as a means to avoiding ground combat with own troops. A prominent 
strand of the literature argues that this is a particularly Western phenomenon; 
a consequence of the casualty aversion of democratic states and their risk-
averse political leaders. In contrast to this line of argument, this Paper argues 
that precision-strike warfare is not a particularly Western phenomenon, but 
that it follows from the proliferation of precision-strike technologies prompted 
by military modernization processes and the transformation of power in what 
Bauman calls “liquid modernity”. In liquid modernity, the major technique of 
power is the rejection of territorial confinement and the related responsibilities 
and costs of order-building. Based on these thoughts, this Paper argues that we 
have to understand precision-strike warfare with its hit-and-run characteristics 
as liquid warfare: a way of war that shuns the direct control of territory, focus-
ing instead on the destruction of enemy forces and/or infrastructure, copying 
certain characteristics of guerrilla warfare. 
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Modern warfare is becoming “liquid”
Bauman’s thoughts on “liquid modernity” provide 
an alternative account to the “Western way of war”–
thesis. An account that explains the practice of  
precision-strike warfare on the basis of the transfor-
mation of power in late modernity, which is not limited 
to Western or democratic states only. For Bauman, 
power in the present part of modernity has become 
liquid; we might as well say: elusive. Moving freely 
and, if necessary, out of reach of others to abdicate 
from one’s responsibility, is the central feature of 
power in our time. Accordingly, warfare that prefers 
airstrikes over ground forces is less the result of dem-
ocratic institutions and values, but rather that of the 
general evolution of power. In what I call liquid war-
fare, modern states shy away from the burdens and 
responsibilities of controlling and administrating 
territory because they believe that they have more 
cost-effective means of control at their disposal.  
Modern military technology enables them to decide 
when and where to attack, to strike the enemy with 
high precision while being inaccessible to any mean-
ingful counterstrike. They rely on hit-and-run tactics, 
somewhat similar to central principles of guerrilla 
warfare, where mobility and speed trump sheer mass.
A proliferation of liquid warfare could 
have negative consequences for the 
future of military intervention
Liquid warfare is a highly problematic practice, 
regardless of the state, whether democratic or auto-
cratic, that engages in it. Rather than seeing large-
scale and long-term missions like those in Afghanistan 
or Iraq, we might increasingly see smaller and shorter 
interventions due to the proliferation of liquid war-
fare. While some observers might see this as a posi-
tive development, there is a significant catch. Such a 
development could spur the blurring of the boundaries 
between war and peace as it is already unfolding in 
the wake of the global “war on terror”. Furthermore, if 
it becomes a common practice of powerful modern 
states to intervene with methods of liquid warfare in 
conflicts in other states—whether in their neigh-
bourhood or globally—this might, over time, lead to 
Precision-strike warfare has become 
the means of choice for military  
interventions of Western states
Western states increasingly shy away from the 
use of own ground forces in their military interven-
tions. Instead, they rely on precision strikes that are 
enabled by a network of sophisticated military tech-
nologies, including modern ground attack aircraft, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), precision-guided 
munitions, air- and space-based sensors; all inter-
linked by modern communication technologies. We 
could witness this practice with the intervention of 
the United States-led coalition of several states in the 
Libyan civil war, and it is the central feature of the 
fight against so-called Islamic State (IS), where the 
United States and its coalition partners rely primarily 
on air strikes. The most extreme and illustrative case 
is the increasing use of armed drones for targeted 
killings, a practice that had already started in the 
United States under the administration of George W. 
Bush, but which was significantly expanded by the 
Obama administration.
Non-Western states have started to 
copy this hit-and-run warfare 
It is frequently argued that the preference for air 
strikes is a particularly Western phenomenon, that 
the casualty aversion of democratic states in combi-
nation with democratic decision-making procedures 
has produced a particular “Western” or “liberal” way 
of war. However, such an explanation is insufficient, 
because it cannot explain why non-Western, auto-
cratic states are starting to copy the practices of pre-
cision-strike warfare. What, for example, do we make 
of the engagement of non-Western, authoritarian 
states such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab  
Emirates (UAE) in the air-strike campaign against IS? 
Further cases in point are the bombing campaign of 
Saudi Arabia in Yemen or the air strikes of Russia 
conducted in Syria and Iraq. The ongoing processes of 
military modernization in states like Russia and 
China in particular are likely to further the spread of 
precision-strike warfare beyond Western states.
Main findings
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changes of the international principles and norms 
governing the use of force. In particular, it could pro-
mote the decoupling of territorial sovereignty and 
the legitimate use of force, and it could further tip 
the balance in favour of short-term reactive, rather 
than long-term preventive strategies. Consequently, 
the trend of Western states to rely on precision 
strikes as a preferred means of warfare is already 
problematic in itself. The problem, though, is ampli-
fied by the proliferation of liquid warfare beyond the 
group of Western states. .
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its cumbersome corollaries of order-building,  
order-maintenance and the responsibility for the 
consequences of it all as well as of the necessity to 
bear their costs” (Bauman, 2000, p. 11). If power has 
become liquid in late modernity, we should not be 
surprised that warfare has become liquid, too. Follow-
ing Bauman’s thoughts, I call warfare that does not 
aim to gain control over territory but aims to destroy 
the forces and/or infrastructure of the enemy by hit-
and-run precision strikes, liquid warfare. I use this 
term in particular to underline the connection of this 
way of fighting with the problematic tendencies of 
liquid modernity as identified by Bauman, most im-
portantly, the decoupling of power—in this case mili-
tary power—and responsibility. 
The remainder of this Paper intends to substantiate 
the arguments introduced here. It will start with a 
look at some recent developments in how Western 
states fight their wars. Then, it will elaborate on  
Bauman’s thoughts on liquid modernity and deduce 
the principles of liquid warfare from them. From this 
follows a discussion of how ‘Western’ this way of war 
really is. The Paper concludes with some thoughts on 
the potential future of military intervention and the 
problems of liquid warfare.
This Paper is about modern warfare and the way it 
is evolving in light of the proliferation of cutting-edge 
military technologies, in particular those technologies 
that enable states to strike their enemies with preci-
sion and from a safe distance. The bombing campaign 
of several states against so called Islamic State (IS) by 
various states is the latest example of the attempt to 
conduct some kind of hit-and-run warfare from a 
safe distance without having to engage in ground 
combat with own troops. The basic concept of hit-
and-run attacks as such is not a new military phe-
nomenon at all. It was, and still is, a central tactic of 
guerrilla warfare. However, the hit-and-run attacks 
conducted nowadays over Iraq, Syria, or Yemen by 
means of modern aircraft, cruise missiles, or un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are neither the resort 
to strategies of the weak nor a mere addition to a 
broader, more traditional military campaign. Instead, 
precision-strike warfare seems to have become a, if 
not the, central feature of modern warfare and mili-
tary interventions. It enables states to influence vio-
lent conflicts without bearing the risks that military 
interventions with other, more traditional means, i.e. 
the involvement of own ground forces, would entail. 
This very advantage—to avoid or to “transfer” the 
risks of war—has led to a significant body of literature 
that characterizes this way of war as a particularly 
Western, democratic, or liberal way of war. The 
casualty aversion of liberal societies and their demo-
cratically elected political leaders has led several  
observers to this conclusion. 
It is the central argument of this Paper that such 
an analysis, while it may not be wrong, does not  
provide us with the complete motivations and driving 
factors for this way of war. In addition to making war 
less risky, precision-strike warfare allows intervening 
powers to shun the costs and responsibilities that 
would otherwise come along with the control and  
administration of territory, as it was the case, for ex-
ample, with the interventions in the Kosovo, in  
Afghanistan and in Iraq. This way of war is in line 
with the “prime technique of power” in what the  
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman refers to as “liquid mo-
dernity”: “escape, slippage, elision and avoidance, the 
effective rejection of any territorial confinement with 
Introduction
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Western states have shied away from using 
ground forces in their recent military interventions. 
This is, not least, the result of the unsuccessful and 
costly interventions in Afghanistan and, particularly, 
in Iraq. While its military superiority enabled the 
United States to defeat Saddam Hussein’s army swiftly 
in 2003, the sobering experience in the aftermath of 
this war (and the wars in Afghanistan) has led to a 
change in US military doctrine that is reflected, for 
example, in the latest Strategic Defense Guidance of 
2012 (The White House, 2012) and the Quadrennial 
Defense Review of 2014 (United States Department of 
Defense, 2014). The role of military counterinsurgency, 
in particular in the framework of long-term “stabili-
sation” operations, involving a significant presence of 
troops on the ground, is significantly downgraded. 
Instead, military planning in this field focuses on the 
concept of “light footprint,” involving special forces, 
drones, limited air strikes, and the support of allied 
groups with training and equipment (Overhaus, 2015). 
We could witness this shift in military strategy 
in 2011, when the United States led a coalition of sev-
eral states that intervened in the Libyan civil war and 
helped to topple the Gaddafi regime. US-American 
and British naval forces fired over 100 Tomahawk 
cruise missiles, and the US, French and British air 
forces among others carried out air strikes against 
tanks and other vehicles of the Gaddafi forces.  
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), like the Global 
Hawk (for surveillance) and the Predator and Reaper 
(for striking targets on the ground) were also involved. 
Between April and late August 2011 (when Libyan rebels 
captured Tripoli), US Predator drones had launched 
over 90 strikes with Hellfire missiles (Ackerman, 2011). 
With the exception of some special forces, there were 
no US, British, or French boots on the ground. Instead, 
anti-Gaddafi forces were supplied with weapons and 
equipment by France, the United States and other 
states. 
In the fight against so-called Islamic State (IS), 
the United States and its coalition partners rely pri-
marily on air strikes, too. To stop the advance of IS 
and to prevent further atrocities and massacres, the 
United States started with its air strikes against IS 
positions in Iraq on 8 August 2014. They were joined 
by France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Australia, Denmark, Canada, Morocco, and Jordan. 
In September 2014, the United States initiated air 
strikes against IS and the Al Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra 
Front in Syria. While Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar participated in the 
air campaign early on, Canada, Turkey, Australia, and 
France followed later. According to Airwars.org, a con-
sortium of independent journalists, the international 
coalition had conducted 7,846 air strikes against IS in 
Iraq and Syria, 5,124 in Iraq and 2,722 in Syria by 2 No-
vember 2015. The United States had conducted the 
large majority of these strikes (69.8 per cent in Iraq, 
and 94.8 per cent in Syria).1 Airwars.org considers it 
 
plausible that between 639 and 916 civilian non-com-
batants were killed.2 According to estimates of the  
international coalition, 20,000 IS fighters were killed 
by the bombings. However, such numbers should be 
handled with extreme care, given that how such esti-
mates are produced is highly disputable.3 To avoid 
misunderstandings with regard to the term preci-
sion-strike that is used in this Paper, it is important to 
note that this term is meant to indicate that certain 
military technologies allow significantly more preci-
sion in hitting the target than earlier generations of 
weapons systems did. But this does not per se legitimize 
the use of force, and it does not mean that the result-
ing casualties are negligible.
Precision-strike capabilities are indispensable 
when conducting such air-campaigns. The basis are 
precision-guided munitions (PGMs) like the GBU-12 
Paveway laser-guided bomb, or AGM-114 Hellfire mis-
sile, in combination with real-time targeting networks.4 
In fact, a whole network of sophisticated military 
technologies is enabling the United States and its 
partners to intervene in violent conflicts via airstrikes. 
Commentators and analysts often refer to this network 
of technologies as a “system of system” that is the  
1 \  See www.airwars.org. Accessed on 03 November 2015.
2 \  See www.airwars.org. Accessed on 03 November 2015.
3 \  For example, as the New York Times reported in 2012, the Obama ad-
ministration adopted a policy of counting effectively all military-age 
males in a strike zone as combatants. See Becker & Scott (2012).
4 \  For an overview and more background on precision-strike capabilities 
and their evolution, see Watts (2013).
Precision-strike warfare as the highpoint of 
the “new Western way of war”
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This particular approach to warfare is frequently 
characterised as a “new Western way of war,” which 
implies that democratic institutions and values, in 
particular a high “casualty-aversion,” are the central 
factors that have furthered this mode of warfare. 
Probably the most renowned representative of this 
line of argument is Martin Shaw (2005), who coined 
the term “new Western way of war.” According to him, 
the new Western way of war can be called a 
“risk-transfer war,” because it 
[…] centers on minimizing life-risks to the military 
– and hence all-important political and electoral risks 
to their masters – at the expense not only of the ‘ene-
mies’ but also of those whom the West agrees are ‘in-
nocent’ (Shaw, 2005. p. 1).7 
This argument is based on the classical liberal 
thought, reflected in the democratic-peace literature,8 
that, in a democratic system, politicians respond to 
their citizens (their electorate) who are generally 
war-averse because they have to bear the costs of 
war—in terms of financial costs and the (potential) 
loss of life. Based upon this premise, Shaw formulates 
several “rules of risk-transfer war” (Shaw, 2005, pp. 71–
97). He states that wars must minimise casualties to 
Western troops, be limited spatially to distant zones 
of war, and be strictly time-limited (“quick-fix wars”). 
According to Shaw, the Vietnam War in particular 
and the pullback in consequence of the massive pro-
tests at home taught this lesson to US-American poli-
cymakers. In consequence, so the argument, the 
United States and its Western allies prefer, whenever 
possible, airpower instead of boots on the ground as 
their weapon of choice. 9 
This particular way of war is highly problematic. 
By using the term “risk-transfer war,” Shaw already 
points at what some authors would call the “dark 
side” or an “antinomy” of the democratic peace 
(Müller, 2004; Müller & Wagner, 2007): the transfer of 
the risks to those at the receiving end of the bombing 
campaigns. This transfer of the risks of war away 
from Western societies and policymakers lowers the 
7 \  The thesis that fighting wars is increasingly seen as an exercise of risk 
management is supported by Coker (2009).
8 \  See for example Russet & Oneal (2001), or Brown, Lynn-Jones, & Miller. 
(1996).
9 \  Cohen (2001) calls this “the new American way of war.”
result of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In-
deed, the RMA can be characterised as the integration 
of several technologies, including weapon platforms 
like modern ground attack aircraft or UAVs, preci-
sion-guided munitions, air- and space-based sensors, 
interlinked by modern communication technologies. 
The application of such a system of systems has led 
to a massive reduction in the so-called sensor-to-
shooter gap and to a new way of warfare (Clarke, 2001; 
Freedman, 1998; Mutschler, 2013, pp 27–28); a way of 
war that allows a military to fight from a distance, 
making it hard, if not impossible, for its enemies to 
strike back. 
The most extreme and illustrative case is the in-
creasing use of armed drones for targeted killings, a 
practice that had been initiated by the administra-
tion of George W. Bush, but that was significantly ex-
panded by the Obama administration. Some refer to 
this extensive use of armed drones in combination 
with special forces as “Obama’s Way of War” (Sanger, 
2012; Schörnig, 2014, p. 231). The Bureau of Investiga-
tive Journalism reported 180 US drone strikes in Af-
ghanistan in 2015 that killed between 775 and 1,157 
people; approx. 20 US drone strikes in Yemen that 
killed between 71 and 99 people and 13 drone strikes 
by the CIA in Pakistan that killed between 60 and 85 
people.5 The Pentagon is planning to expand the 
number of US drone flights significantly over the 
years to come. The current number of 61 daily flights 
shall be raised to 90 in 2019 (Lubold, 2015). While this 
indicates that the Obama administration seems to 
consider drone strikes as an effective tool, this policy 
is highly controversial. In addition to the highly prob-
lematic practice of generally counting military-age 
males in a strike zone as combatants,6  there is the 
general criticism that these strikes are counter-
productive in the “war on terror” inasmuch as they 
help militant groups with their recruitment by radi-
calising local populations in the areas where drone 
strikes are conducted (Zenko, 2013, pp. 10–11).
5 \  See www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones.  
Accessed on 18 December 2015.
6 \  See footnote 3.
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threshold of gathering support for war as a means of 
foreign policy. It may even allow policymakers to by-
pass democratic decision-making procedures. A case 
in point was when the Obama administration did not 
ask Congress for the authorization of its military ac-
tions in Libya in 2011 under the War Power Act, with 
the argument that the military engagement in form 
of air strikes from a distance was limited and that 
there was no risk of own casualties. Sauer and Schörnig 
(2012) make this case when they argue that “killer 
drones” constitute an antinomy of the democratic 
peace. While their use may result from the interests 
and norms of democratic systems (casualty aversion), 
the drones may make democracies more war-prone if 
they can transfer the risks of war via the use of drones. 
There are several other problems of this particular 
way of war, and I will come back to them in the con-
clusion of this Paper. Before that, however, the following 
sections argue that we have good reason to interpret 
precision-strike warfare not as a purely Western or 
democratic phenomenon.
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 a useful instrument of power only in solid modernity. 
With the panopticon, the surveillant does limit the 
freedom of movement of the inmates, exercising con-
trol and power over them. But this form of exercising 
power comes at a cost. The surveillant’s freedom of 
movement is limited by the physical characteristics 
of the panopticon, too. In addition, keeping the inmates 
in the surveilled place creates a number of costly and 
burdensome administrative tasks like the erection 
and maintenance of buildings or the hiring and pay-
ment of personnel. Furthermore, exercising control 
via the panopticon means taking responsibility for 
the general functioning of the place. In liquid moder-
nity, power has become “post-Panoptical” (Bauman. 
2000. p. 11). Those in power are relieved from the terri-
torial restraints of the panopticon and can escape 
their responsibilities.
[…] power has become truly exterritorial [emphasis 
by the author], no longer bound, not even slowed 
down, by the resistance of space […]. What matters 
in post-Panoptical power-relations is that the people 
operating the levers of power on which the fate of the 
less volatile partners in the relationship depends can 
at any moment escape beyond reach – into sheer inac-
cessibility (Bauman, 2000, p. 11).
Bauman applies these thoughts to various fields 
of modern life, for example to the changing power  
relationship between capital and labour. While in 
“heavy capitalism,” labour and capital were mutually 
dependent, this interdependence has dissolved in 
“light capitalism” under the conditions of globalization. 
Capital has become liquid; it travels fast and easily 
around the globe without much resistance from bor-
ders. Labour, in contrast, remains much less mobile. 
For Baumann, this difference is the basis of the con-
temporary dominance of capital over labour. 
Bauman also applies his concept of power in liquid 
modernity to war (Bauman, 2000, 2001, 2002). Accord-
ingly, powerful states’ warfare is becoming exterrito-
rial. During the period of solid modernity, power and 
wealth were based to a large extent on the ability to 
exploit the resources of the land. Consequently, to 
conquer and then to control territory was a major 
goal of political leaders. Progress meant territorial  
extension. Bauman calls the conquest and possession 
Bauman’s thoughts on the role of power in what 
he calls “liquid modernity” (Bauman, 2000, p. 9) provide 
an alternative reading to the “new Western way of 
war”-hypothesis. Accordingly, a way of warfare that 
prefers airstrikes over ground forces is not the result 
of democratic institutions and values, but stems from 
the general evolution of power, in particular the re-
duced significance of the conquest and control of  
territory to powerful, modern states.
In his seminal work on “liquid modernity,” Bau-
man (2000) uses the metaphor of “liquidity” to  
describe what he considers the present part of mo-
dernity. In contrast to solids, liquids change their 
form much faster and easier. They are moving faster; 
they are in flow. According to Bauman, it is the same 
with regard to power. Liquidity (or fluidity), the capa-
bility to move freely and, if necessary, out of reach of 
others in order to abdicate from one’s responsibility, 
is the central feature of power in our time. Power has 
become exterritorial; it is no longer bound to a par-
ticular space. Those who are able to move faster and 
decide about the speed of activities rule. “Velocity of 
movement and access to faster means of mobility 
steadily rose in modern times to the position of the 
principal tool of power and domination” (Bauman, 
2000, p. 9). In a similar way, Virilio (1986; 1983) has  
described speed as the new, and central, source of 
power in modern industrialized societies. Virilio 
(1983) calls the industrial revolution a “dromocratic 
revolution,” (pp. 44–45)10  in which inventions like 
the steam engine and later the combustion engine 
led to a quantum leap in the fabrication of speed, and 
to the investment of power in acceleration itself. 
Bauman refers to the concept of the panopticon 
to illustrate the changing form of power in modernity. 
Bentham has conceptualized the panopticon in the 
late 18th century as a prison in which the inmates 
can be watched from a central point, without being 
able to tell whether or not they are being watched. 
Foucault (1977) employs the panopticon as the symbol 
for the modern exertion of power because it allows a 
single watchman to constantly control all inmates in 
an effective way. Yet, for Bauman, the panopticon was 
 
10 \  From the Greek word “dromos” (race/running course).
Power and organized violence in “liquid modernity” 
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For a long time, it has not been possible to 
achieve such political ends without establishing  
direct control over territory with ground forces that 
were to be deployed on the respective territory. With 
the advent of the Revolution in Military Affairs and 
the military options provided by precision-strike  
capabilities, direct control over territory has lost much 
of its relevance in military-strategic terms. When 
battle tanks and infantry were the principal military 
means, a large territory provided the defender with 
room for manoeuvre and rearguard action, while the 
long distances posed a formidable challenge to the 
attacker. However, for an attacker equipped with pre-
cision-guided munitions and all the systems necessary 
to put them to use, these tenets of military strategy 
no longer apply. To the contrary, being bound to a par-
ticular space has become a disadvantage, because it 
exposes you to the force of your enemy. While this is 
less of a problem in a symmetric situation when this 
exposure holds for all parties in a similar manner, the 
situation changes dramatically when one side is able 
to move freely and, if necessary, out of the reach of 
the other and when it can decide on the speed of its 
activities.
From the perspective of Virilio, these changes in 
the conduct of warfare are the logical consequence of 
the “dromocratic revolution.” Speed has replaced 
space as the essential dimension of warfare. He calls 
these developments a shift “from geo- to chrono-poli-
tics: the distribution of territory becomes the distri-
bution of time” (Virilio & Lotringer, 1983, p. 115). Bau-
man (2000), more bluntly, speaks of “hit-and-run” 
warfare (pp. 186–189), taking NATO’s bombing cam-
paign against Serbia as its prototype. However, while 
this might be considered an adequate description for 
the NATO air strikes against Serbian troops and infra-
structure, the picture changes significantly when we 
look at the aftermath of this conflict and in particular 
at the responsibilities that NATO member states ac-
cepted when they set up and led the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) mission tasked to provide a secure environ-
ment in the Kosovo. In September 2015, 4,800 KFOR 
troops were still present in Kosovo.11  So, with the 
11 \  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm. Accessed 04 
November 2015.
of territory a “modern obsession” and solid modernity 
“the era of territorial conquest” (Bauman, 2000. p. 114). 
This era reached its peak with the imperialist compe-
tition for colonization at the end of the 19th century. 
The situation has significantly changed in liquid  
modernity. The power of the late-modern state rests 
upon the capacities of its industry, not the size of its 
territory. Of course, this industry still depends on  
natural resources, but in today’s era of globalization, 
access to them is via free trade rather than territorial 
conquest. “Ascendancy over a territory, and even 
more so the administration and the management of 
its population, has ceased to be the stake of the global 
power struggle […]” (Bauman, 2001, p. 13). This does 
not mean that military might has no role to play in 
liquid modernity. According to Bauman (2001), we can 
witness “globalizing wars” in which the goal is not to 
take over territory, but “to remove the obstacles on 
the road to a truly global freedom of economic forces 
[…]” (p. 16). Referring to the famous dictum of Clause-
witz, for Bauman (2000), today’s wars look like the 
“promotion of global free trade by other means” (p. 12). 
This perception of today’s wars as the “promotion 
of global free trade by other means” is much too simple. 
As critics of Bauman correctly point out, the reasons 
for the use of organized violence are much more 
complex, and in many violent conflicts, territorial 
claims still play an important role (Malešević, 2008). 
Cleary, territory has not become irrelevant. However, 
when we look at the recent cases where industrialized 
states engage in violent conflict, we find that they 
usually have a variety of goals and motivations for  
resorting to the use of violence that go beyond the 
crude dichotomy of conquering territory vs asserting 
trade interests. One goal of organized violence might 
be to establish temporary safe- or no-fly zones out of 
humanitarian concerns. Depending on whether a  
regime is either considered a friend or a foe, another 
goal could be to violently topple or to support that 
particular regime Another example of organized vio-
lence can be found in the form of targeted killings 
when the targeted individual or the group of individ-
uals is considered an enemy in the “war on terror”. 
This list is not exhaustive, but it illustrates that the 
reasons for modern states to go to war are manifold.
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presence of their troops on the ground in Kosovo, and 
in a similar manner after the Western military inter-
ventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, we might say that 
the intervening powers, set up the panopticon and 
installed themselves as watchman. Consequently, 
they had to bear the costs that come with this way of 
exercising power. Intervening powers had to invest 
significant resources—in terms of money and of 
manpower—in these missions and additional support 
measures. NATO’s International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, for example,  
involved over 30,000 troops form 48 nations in October 
2014 (NATO, 2014); a few months before it was re-
placed in January 2015 by the Resolute Support Mission 
(RSM) with a total strength of 12,905 (as of December 
2015), that is tasked with training, advising and  
assisting the Afghan security forces (NATO, 2015). This 
constant presence on the ground limited the freedom 
of movement of the intervening forces and made 
them vulnerable to attacks in the form of ambushes, 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, 
and the like. 
One reaction to this situation was increasing 
“bunkerization” (Duffield, 2012); i.e. the retreat of 
troops (and other personnel) to fortified compounds 
and the minimization of exposure to the world out-
side of these compounds. Furthermore, intervening 
states reacted to these attacks by increasingly shying 
away from the burdens of controlling and administrat-
ing territory (as I have shown in the previous section). 
In line with the principles of liquidity, they now seek 
to relieve themselves from the territorial restraints of 
the panopticon. They do this, by copying a central  
element of the guerrilla warfare of their opponents: 
hit-and-run tactics. Being unable to defeat a regular 
army, such hit-and-run attacks, where small and 
highly mobile groups attack larger, regular troop for-
mations, trying to inflict as much damage as possible, 
and then quickly withdraw to avoid the likely defeat 
in regular combat, are among the essential means of 
guerrilla warfare. By avoiding decisive battle and rely-
ing instead on sabotage and ambush has transformed 
the face of war. 12 Clausewitz already notes this in 
12 \  On the methods and the history of guerilla warfare, see for example 
Boot (2013) or Townshend (2005).
what he called “people’s war” in chapter 26 of the 
sixth book of his seminal On War: 
According to our idea of a people’s war, it should, like 
a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, never condense 
into a solid body; otherwise the enemy sends an ade-
quate force against this core, crushes it, and makes a 
great many prisoners; their courage sinks; everyone 
thinks the main question is decided, any further ef-
fort useless, and the arms fall from the hands of the 
people. Still, however, on the other hand, it is neces-
sary that this mist should collect at some points into 
denser masses, and form threatening clouds from 
which now and again a formidable flash of lightning 
may burst forth (Clausewitz, 1997, p. 312).
By copying this tactic and combining it with the 
means provided by cutting-edge military technologies 
like drones and precision-guided munitions, late 
modern armies try to regain the sovereignty over the 
decision, when and where to attack.
In sum, we can observe the liquidation of organ-
ized violence, or what I call liquid warfare. In liquid 
warfare, mobility and speed trump sheer mass. It is a 
way of war that does not aim to control territory, but 
aims to destroy the forces and/or infrastructure of 
the enemy in order to break his will. To decide when 
and where to attack, striking the opponent with high 
precision while being inaccessible oneself is the 
dominant method of liquid warfare. Its central moti-
vation is the avoidance of responsibilities and costs 
that come along with the control over territory.
ON THE ROAD TO LIQUID WARFARE?\ MAX M. MUTSCHLER
14 \ \ WORKING PAPER 3  \ 2016
make use of the full spectrum of technological possi-
bilities (Mutschler, 2013), the process of military tech-
nological advance is embedded in the commitment 
of modern industrial societies to the pursuit of tech-
nological innovation. According to Buzan and Eric 
Herring (1998, pp. 50–51), this commitment is probably 
strongest in capitalist societies in which technological 
innovation is seen as engine of economic growth. As 
Toffler & Toffler (1993) conclude, “the way we make 
war reflects the way we make wealth” (p. 2). 
This does not mean to deny the role that casualty 
aversion did play as one driving factor that promoted 
the development of military technologies, in particular 
in the field of robotics and automated weapon systems. 
It is very plausible that casualty aversion was and 
still is an important factor in this regard. But, as the 
new military technologies are being developed and 
used effectively (from the military technological 
point of view), why shouldn’t non-Western states—
for which, by the way, casualties among their troops 
are not beneficial, either—forego the potential mili-
tary option that such technologies bring?
In addition to the military capability, states must 
have the political will to intervene in conflicts outside 
of their own territory. This might seem trivial, but a 
state that defines its security interests purely in 
terms of defending its borders and territorial integrity 
against any foreign power, might well have the tech-
nological basis to develop precision-strike capabilities, 
but might still consider battle tanks and a mass mo-
bilization army the better investment in its security. 
In reality, of course, things are not as straightforward, 
because the applications of military technology are 
much more complex, and a clear-cut distinction  
between “solid” and “liquid” weapons—as between 
offensive and defensive weapons—is not possible. But 
technological capability and political motivation 
must fall together for states to practice liquid warfare. 
Whether the political motivation originates from  
liberal humanitarianism and the subsequent aim to 
stop mass atrocities or to overthrow the regime re-
sponsible for them, or whether the intervention is 
motivated by the interest to support such a regime 
for the sake of helping an ally and securing zones of 
influence, matters if we want to judge such 
In contrast to the concepts of a particularly 
“Western” or “liberal” way of war, liquid warfare is not 
directly related to a particular political system. While 
Zygmunt Bauman has developed his thoughts on war 
in liquid modernity on the basis of Western states’ 
conduct of war, too (see above), there is no Western or 
democracy bias in his argument. Instead, Bauman’s 
thoughts beg the question whether the “new Western 
way of war” is a way of applying organized violence 
that is reserved for Western states only. While for  
authors like Shaw (2005) or Coker (2009), the reduced 
role of ground forces in favour of air-strikes is ex-
plained as an exercise in risk-management by demo-
cratically elected governments, for Bauman, it is the 
result of a liquid operating mode of power, in which 
engaging in ground combat is useless or even counter-
productive (Bauman, 2000, pp. 11–12). 
If this assessment of Bauman is correct, we 
should see practices of liquid warfare by non-Western 
states, too. Of course, this can only be expected of 
such states that have cutting-edge military technolo-
gies at their disposal. In other words, it is not a pre-
requisite to be a democratic, Western state for con-
ducting liquid warfare, but it is necessary to have a 
military that is modernized to such a degree that it 
can conduct precision-strike missions. While Western 
military powers, in particular the United States, are 
leading in this field, the respective technologies are 
not per se Western or non-Western, liberal or non-lib-
eral. In the same vein, modernisation does not neces-
sarily equal Westernization/ democratization (Delanty, 
2007; Joas, 1999). The rise of authoritarian capitalism 
in states like China and Russia (Gat, 2011, 2007) that 
brings with it the modernization of the civil industry 
and of the armed forces, testifies to this.
Military modernization is a consequence of the 
rise of the general level of technological capabilities. 
This finding is at the centre of what Buzan considers 
to be an important factor for the spread of military 
technology and what he called the “technological im-
perative” (Buzan, 1987; Buzan & Herring, 1998). The 
general advancement of technology exercises pres-
sure upon political decision-makers to make use of 
new technologies for the military. While the literature 
on arms control reminds us that states do not always 
How Western is the “new Western way of war”? 
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restore the Hadi government. While the targets of the 
air strikes that started on 26 March 2015 include mili-
tary bases, weapons, or fuel depots of the Huthi forces, 
according to Amnesty International, the attacks also 
destroy civilian homes, result in scores of civilian 
deaths and injuries as they fail to distinguish be-
tween civilian and military objects and are also dis-
proportionate and indiscriminate (Amnesty Interna-
tional, 2015a). Saudi Arabia would not be able to 
conduct such an air campaign on its own. It not only 
relies on Western military technology, but also on 
support from the United States as regards intelligence 
and surveillance images for target selection (DeYoung, 
2015). This illustrates the sophisticated network of 
various technologies that is necessary to conduct  
liquid warfare. Furthermore, it illustrates that com-
mercial arms exports play a significant role for the 
proliferation of these technologies. 
The situation is completely different with regard 
to states like Russia or China. Over the last years,  
Russia has placed particular emphasis on the mod-
ernization of its military, which is in “transition from 
mass mobilisation army to modern combat force” 
(Klein & Pester, 2014). This reform process was initiated 
after the 2008 war with Georgia, which had exposed 
several deficits of the Russian military. Russia’s mili-
tary reform means significant changes with regard to 
organisation, concepts, personnel and weaponry.  
Rapidly deployable, smaller, more professional and 
more agile brigades are to replace the mass mobilisa-
tion army. Joint operations of the services is one of 
the key goals. Russia has set up a Special Operations 
Command to be able to intervene rapidly in local con-
flicts and to counter terrorism, drug trafficking and 
insurgency. Another central element of the reform is 
to improve the military’s equipment and weaponry. 
This includes the procurement of precision weapons, 
new aircraft and automated command systems in  
order to close the gap on the United States with regard 
to network-centric operations (Klein & Pester, 2014). 
In December 2014, Vladimir Putin signed a new 
military doctrine, in which Russia asserts its claim to 
power in the post-Soviet space. It considers the estab-
lishment of regimes in Russia’s neighbourhood that 
are detrimental to Russian interests a danger. In 
interventions from a normative perspective; but both 
reasons can explain why a particular state might be 
willing to intervene in armed conflict. 
In the following, I will present several examples 
that illustrate the point that precision-strike hit-and-
run warfare is no longer a particularly Western concept 
and practice. 
Several Arab states participated in the air cam-
paign in Libya in 2011. While Qatar and Jordan partic-
ipated only with fighter aircraft in the implementation 
of the no-fly zone, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Air 
Force with six F-16 Fighting Falcon and six Mirage 
2000 fighter jets conducted air strikes against targets 
on the ground. Particularly interesting in this context, 
Arab military intervention in Libya did not stop after 
2011. Reportedly, in August 2014, there were several  
attacks conducted by UAE Air Force with F-16 aircraft 
on Islamist-held targets in Tripoli, using Egyptian 
airbases. While the ongoing turmoil in Libya is of 
concern to Egypt, its government does not seek any 
direct involvement in the conflicts across its western 
border with own ground forces. Still present are the 
memories of the disastrous Egyptian military inter-
vention in Yemen (1962–1967), and there is no consen-
sus in the Arab League about building a larger coalition. 
In this situation, limited air strikes against Islamist 
bases in Libya, with the help of the UAE, that is seek-
ing a more active foreign policy in the region, seemed 
to be a viable option for the Egyptian government 
(McGregor, 2014).
The participation of Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates and Jordan, among others in air strike 
campaigns against so-called Islamic State, was made 
possible because these states imported modern West-
ern military technology. The Royal Saudi Air Force, for 
example, uses Eurofighter Typhoon combat jets and 
Paveway IV precision-guided bombs, developed by 
Raytheon in the United States and the United King-
dom, to strike so-called IS targets (Chuter, 2015). Due 
to exports, mainly from the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the Saudi Air Force has at its disposal 
F-15 and Tornado jets, too. With the help of these 
weapons systems, Saudi Arabia it is not only attack-
ing IS targets in Iraq, but is also leading an air cam-
paign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen in order to 
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preventing such developments, Russia seems to be 
willing to engage in, what is called “hybrid warfare,” 
including the use of special forces, irregular armed 
groups and private military companies (Klein, 2015). 
Russia’s military involvement in the fighting in Eastern 
Ukraine can be considered the prototype of this kind 
of warfare that is, possibly closer to the concept of  
liquid warfare than one might think in the first in-
stance. While Russia’s actions against Ukraine at first 
glance seem to contradict the thesis of the loss of im-
portance of territory and fighting on the ground, at a 
second glance, the picture is more nuanced. While 
Russia did conquer and occupy the Crimea with its 
own (although disguised) troops, it uses a different 
practice in Eastern Ukraine where it supports rebel 
forces in a less direct manner. It is important to note 
in this context, that the absence of Russian air strikes 
in its support of the pro-Russian forces in Eastern 
Ukraine was not the result of a lack of capability to do 
so, but rather the result of Moscow’s denial of in-
volvement in the conflict (Baev, 2015, p. 19). In any 
event, the central point is that, although there is 
much speculation about Russia’s motives, it seems 
plausible, that Russia is much more interested in 
de-stabilizing Ukraine to gain (re-)leverage over 
Ukrainian politics, than in conquering Ukrainian ter-
ritory. As Konończuk (2014) puts it: 
Russia probably calculates that, thanks to its largely 
unchallenged influence in Crimea and possibly in 
other regions, it will be able to obtain effective and 
long-term leverage over Ukraine’s main strategic  
decisions, including future moves on European inte-
gration (para. 3).
The Russian aim in Syria is not related to the 
conquest of territory, either, but is quite different 
from that in Ukraine. Russia’s military activities in 
Syria are not motivated by the desire to destabilize a 
certain regime. To the contrary, the Russian goal is 
the stabilization of the Assad regime, which it con-
siders to be its closest ally in the region. In order to 
achieve this goal, Russia uses its most modern military 
technology to destroy forces and infrastructure of 
those groups that it labels as “terrorist”. While this 
does include so-called IS, the majority of the Russian 
air strikes are aimed at other groups. While Russia 
seems to be using largely unguided bombs in these 
attacks (Barrie & Dempsey, 2015), in September 2015, 
six Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft arrived at Latakia 
airport in Syria to attack forces opposing the Syrian 
government. This enables Russia to conduct precision 
strikes from an altitude of over 5,000 metres, by using 
state-of-the art precision-guided bombs and missiles. 
According to Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu, 
as of Mid-December 2015, the Russian air force has 
flown about 4,000 sorties since the start of its aerial 
intervention and has destroyed over 8,000 pieces of 
military infrastructure (Bodner, 2015). What the min-
ister does not say is that these air strikes have killed 
hundreds of civilians, in particular in residential areas 
(Amnesty International, 2015b). Russia has also 
launched several of its new Kalibr cruise missiles, 
also known as 3M-14s at targets in Syria. This new 
Russian cruise missile, similar to the American Tom-
ahawk, is reported to have a much longer range than 
older Russian models, perhaps reaching 1,550 miles. 
This enabled Russia to launch them from warships in 
the Caspian Sea at targets in Syria (Lyons, 2015).
China is not only modernizing its economy but 
its military, too. It has several, rather traditional con-
cerns when it comes to security policy. One may 
think of the longstanding conflict over Taiwan or the 
various conflicts with Japan or the Philippines over 
territorial waters and islands. However, as the world 
economic power it has become, China relies increas-
ingly on the import of commodities and the export of 
manufactured goods and, hence, on the safety of and 
access to international trade routes. Safeguarding 
China’s “development interests” has become a major 
goal of its security and defence policy and is men-
tioned in one breath with national unification and 
territorial integrity in its most recent White Paper on 
Military Strategy (State Council Information Office of 
the People’s Republic of China, 2015). Accordingly,  
piracy, terrorism, regional turmoil, threats to its over-
seas interests (i.e. access to energy and resources as 
well as the security of Chinese personnel and assets 
abroad) are presented as major threats to China’s  
security. In order to meet these threats, China is mod-
ernizing its military. The Peoples Liberation Army 
(PLA) has steadily reduced its personnel as well as old 
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and obsolete equipment and is investing in the pro-
curement of modern systems. “China [is] on the road 
to becoming a modern military power” (Cordesman, 
2014, p. 2). Chinese military experts and planners have 
realized the value of military technologies like long-
range, precise, stealthy, and unmanned weapons sys-
tems, and they are including them into their procure-
ment planning and military doctrine. Mobility and 
flexibility play an important role in this regard. For 
example, the PLA Air Force is supposed to shift the 
focus from its traditional task of territorial air de-
fence to other missions like air strike, airborne opera-
tions, strategic projection and comprehensive sup-
port (State Council Information Office of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2015).
These examples are not to say that the liquida-
tion of warfare is a one-way street and that in the fu-
ture, all organized violence will take the form of liq-
uid warfare. It is much more plausible that we will be 
able to observe, what Bloch (1985), in another context, 
called the “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous”. 
Liquid warfare will be only one among several other, 
more traditional ways of warfighting that might per-
sist in parallel to each other. However, based on the 
thoughts presented so far, we could hypothesize that 
the share of liquid warfare will increase with the pro-
liferation of modern military technologies able to 
conduct precision strikes.
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poppy field in Helmand or on a commuter train in 
Madrid, as Gregory wrote in 2011. With liquid warfare 
spreading, the blurring of the boundary between war 
and peace will increase further, in its temporal and its 
spatial dimension. 
If it becomes a common practice of powerful 
modern states to intervene in conflicts in other states 
with methods of liquid warfare—whether in their 
neighbourhood or globally—this might, over time, 
contribute to normative change, too. Studies on the 
role of international practices suggest a close rela-
tionship between states practices and international 
order (Adler & Pouliot, 2011; Reckwitz, 2003). Practices 
are “the dynamic material and ideational processes 
that enable structures to be stable or to evolve, and 
agents to reproduce or transform structures” (Adler & 
Pouliot, 2011, p. 6). In the case at hand, this would mean 
that the practices of liquid warfare could influence 
the way that the international norms and rules that 
govern the use of force evolve. 
For example, liquid warfare has the potential to 
contribute to the erosion of the norm of territorial 
sovereignty. Schetter and Prinz (2014; 2012), for example, 
argue that the concept of “ungoverned territories”  
decouples territorial sovereignty and the legitimate 
use of force, thereby legitimizing external military 
intervention in those territories. By using drone 
strikes within so-called “kill boxes”—a concept devel-
oped by the US Army in 2005—the United States does 
not aim at (re-)establishing territorial control but 
seeks to conduct selective strikes against an undefined 
enemy. This results in the creation of “fluid, target-
oriented spaces of violence”, and replaces a central 
principle of the international order—territorial control 
by sovereign states—with the principle of security. The 
power of definition of what security means in this 
context lies, of course, with the United States and its 
Western allies. However, in future scenarios in which 
not only the United States and its Western allies, but 
also powerful non-Western states increasingly apply 
military force in a similar way in order further their 
security interests (whatever they may be), the decou-
pling of the legitimate use of force and territorial sov-
ereignty would get an additional boost. 
A proliferation of liquid warfare could have several 
consequences for the future of military intervention. 
While some authors conclude that the sobering expe-
riences in Afghanistan and/or Iraq will lead to a 
“post-interventionist era” (Kümmel & Giegerich, 2013) 
in which there will be less military interventions by 
Western governments, others consider it more likely 
that we might be heading towards a “neo-interven-
tionist era” with much smaller, clandestine and more 
focused interventions in which modern military 
technologies, in particular armed drones play a crucial 
role (Schörnig, 2013). The arguments in this Working 
Paper, in particular the indication that liquid warfare 
is not a particularly Western phenomenon, support 
the latter view. Not all states that have the military 
option to practise liquid warfare will do so, but overall 
the likelihood that governments will intervene in 
hit-and-run manner is likely to increase with the 
proliferation of modern military technology. If it is 
not only the casualty aversion of democratic govern-
ments and their quest for a “clean” use of violence, 
but also the general functionality of long-distance 
precision-strike warfare as a “post-panoptical”  
instrument of power, then it seems quite plausible to 
expect such a “neo-interventionist era”, characterized 
by military interventions that do not aim to establish 
territorial control but aim to subdue the enemy by 
the destruction of his forces and/or infrastructure 
from a distance. 
Such developments would further increase the 
blurring of the boundaries between war and peace—
or rather between war and non-war (if we subscribe 
to a broader conception of peace, going beyond the 
absence of direct violence). Several authors point out 
that the military interventions by the United States 
and its allies, under the label of the “war on terror”, 
have taken on the character of an “endless war” (Keen, 
2006), an “unending war” (Duffield, 2007), or of a “forever 
war” (Filkins, 2009). They criticise that war has 
achieved a state of permanence without any end in 
sight. With his term “everywhere war”, Gregory (2011) 
adds a spatial dimension to the temporal one. “[T]he 
conventional ties between war and geography have 
come undone” (Gregory, 2011, p. 239). Violence cannot 
only erupt at any time, but also at any place; be it in a 
Conclusion: Liquid warfare and the 
future of military intervention
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This is not to say that liquid warfare will inevitably 
lead to a complete dissolution of the boundaries be-
tween war and peace and the erosion of all norms on 
the use of force. Making such a claim is far beyond 
the scope of this Paper—its aim is rather to point at 
some of the potential negative consequences of liquid 
warfare, to highlight the demand for further studies 
of this phenomenon, and, most importantly, the de-
mand for a critical reflection on the proliferation of 
precision-strike warfare. 
Another example for a norm evolution is the nor-
mative framework of the responsibility to protect 
(R2P). It is usually the responsibility to react (responding 
to compelling human need, for example with sanc-
tions, but eventually with military intervention) that 
receives most attention, in particular when there is 
broad media coverage of gross human rights violations 
and mass atrocities. However, the R2P consists of 
three responsibilities altogether. The additional two 
are: the responsibility to prevent (address root causes of 
violent conflict), and the responsibility to rebuild (provide 
assistance to states and societies recovering from  
violent conflict). Chandler (2015) argues that mean-
while, military intervention has been successfully 
separated from the R2P and that we can observe this 
already in the 2011 intervention in Libya, and most 
recently in the campaigns against so-called IS in Iraq 
and Syria. According to Chandler, the concept of R2P 
as a doctrine with all its three pillars, positing a “con-
tinuum from sovereign responsibility to international 
responsibility” (Chandler, 2015, p. 3) was already dead 
before the Libya intervention, as Western states had 
started to bow out of the transformative agenda of 
liberal peacebuilding. From this perspective, Western 
powers did intervene in Libya, Syria and Iraq only  
because they could unshackle themselves from the  
responsibility for the outcomes of the intervention. 
A proliferation of the capacities to practice liquid 
warfare would further this trend to focus on reaction, 
rather than on prevention and rebuilding. Precision-
strike warfare offers low-cost reactions and does pro-
vide the necessary tactical flexibility for significant 
military interventions without own boots on the 
ground. It does not, however, provide sustainable 
strategies to cope with root causes of violent conflicts. 
While it might be instrumental to destroy, it is of no 
help when it comes to the process of rebuilding. In 
particular, such processes of rebuilding structures of 
war-torn societies usually involve a significant pres-
ence on the ground and the acceptance of adminis-
trative costs. It is exactly this responsibility that is 
shunned by the very idea of liquid warfare – a form of 
organized violence that uncouples the use of military 
power from the responsibilities of territorial control 
and administration. 
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